



The Arab Spring in Pakistan?
Abstract:
Pakistan, although it is not an Arab state, has long lasting contacts with the Arab World. 
They arc based on the same religious and cultural foundations and deep economic contact 
as well. Many Pakistanis work in the Gulf States. Pakistani military has been training and 
supporting armed forces of such countries as c.g. Jordan. So the ideas of The Arab Spring 
have influenced young elites of Pakistani society somehow. The goal of the article is to show 
similarities and certain differences between the political situation in Pakistan and Arab 
states (csp. Egypt as comparable by the size and population, and role of military in politics 
too). Phe Author tries to answer the question whether something like the Arab Spring pos­
sible in Pakistan and/or maybe something like that just has happened.
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The aim of the article is to answer the question whether the phenomenon of mass 
protests involving young people that will result in the overthrow/reform of the po­
litical system existing nearly forty years possible in Pakistan? For this purpose, what 
is important are the similarities and differences between the society and the politi­
cal systems of Pakistan and Egypt, which is the largest Arab state in which a social 
movement called the “Arab Spring” emerged.
The population of Pakistan is about 193 million and 239 thousand (83 million 
and 294 thousand in Egypt). For the analysis of the possibility of “south revolution”
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the compaction of demographic structure of society is important. People between 
25 and 54 years of age represent 35.1% of the Pakistani population (in Egypt it is 
a little more - 38.3%). People between 1 5 and 24 - 21.6% (in Egypt, 18%). The larg­
est percentage - 34 are people under 14 years of age (in Egypt, 32%). Population 
growth rate is 1.52% (1.88% for Egypt). If we consider development of civil society, 
the important factor is illiteracy, which remains a serious limitation in access to 
a broader knowledge and active participation in social and political life. In Pakistan, 
people able to read and write, are on average, 54.9% of the population. Among men 
it is 68.6% among women - only 40.3%. In Egypt 72% in total, 80.3% among men 
and 63.5% among women. The difference is even more evident if one compares the 
school age. The average Pakistani starts school at age 8 (7 for females). Egyptians 
at the age of 12 (men go to school a year longer than women). Of course, these 
are estimates and very general statements. One should assume that the problem is 
more acute in rural areas and poor suburbs, than in inhabited bv middle class urban 
neighborhoods. Unemployment rate in Pakistan among people between 15 and 
24 years: 7.7% (in Egypt until 24.8)1.
Demographie and social data for CIA World Factbook: [on-line] https://wxvyv.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/thc-world-factbook/geos/pk.html (Pakistan) and https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
publications/thc-world-factbook/gcos/eg.html (Egypt), 26 June 2014.
“Egypt Economy”, Economy wach, 29 March 2010, [on-line] http://www.economywatch. 
com/world_economv/cgvpt, 26 June 2014.
“Pakistan GDP and Economic Data”, Global I'inance, [on-line] http://www.gfmag.com/gdp- 
data-countrv-reports/204-pakistan-gdp-country-rcport.html , 26 June 2014.
“Poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)”, The World Bank, 
[on-line] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/Sl.POV.2DAY, 26 June 2014.
“blood in Pakistan”, UNDP, [on-line] http://undp.org.pk/flood-in-pakistan.htinl, 26 June 
2013.
Comparison of the economic situation of both countries is also worth men­
tioning. For more objective image, as a starting point we adopted year 2010, so 
a few months before the overthrow of the Mubarak regime in Egypt. Egypt’s GDP 
was then 498.1 billion (purchasing power parity). This gave 6367 USD per capita. 
Economic annual growth was 5.29%. 51% of the population lived below the po­
verty line, defined by the UN on $ 2 a day* 2 *In Pakistan, in the same period the gross 
domestic product was 233.4 billion and per capita income was 1,254 dollars. The 
economy grew by 2.4% per year’. More than 60% Pakistanis lived below the poverty 
line4. It must be remembered that in 2010 Pakistan was hit by devastating flood, 
which destroyed not only buildings, but also farms, which are a major source of 
income’.
The above data can be summarized to the following conclusion: Pakistan is 
a country of poorer and less educated people than was pre-revolutionary Egypt. 
On the one hand, a lower standard of living may be the basis for socio-economic 
revolution, on the other hand, the percentage of people who have access to knowl­
edge useful for a critical overview is actually relatively small. It limits the potential 
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flow of ideas from the Arab states to “Pakistani street”. What is the reason why 
Pakistani political elite do not use the situation in a power struggle? Or they do 
it to the extent that does not lead to violent social reactions? For this purpose, it 
is important to compare the political systems of the two countries. Especially in 
terms of democratic experiences. Focusing solely on the most recent history can be 
seen that in Egypt there was no democratic tradition at all. The major supporters 
of its introduction occurred are Islamic fundamentalists. The monarchy has been 
overthrown 23 July 1952 by the military coup of the Free Officers Movement, led 
bv General Muhammad Negib. He has been replaced during the “palace coup” 
in 1954, bv Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser6 *. His successors: Anwar as-Sadat and Husni 
Mubarak were also heavv-brass military. This meant that the armed forces have 
become the ruling power of the state. Only opposition (often outlawed by the 
authorities) was the fundamentalist organization Muslim Brotherhood'. Egyptian 
National Democratic Party (which is an emanation of the army), became de facto 
sole political power, resampling much more the model known from the Eastern 
Bloc, than that of the Western democracy The situation in Pakistan is quite dif­
ferent. The state has emerged August 14, 1947. It inherited a political system that 
is the legacy of the slow transfer of power, performed by the British on the Indian 
Subcontinent. The first constitution of the state was India Government Act of 
1935. What is important, it was passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
2 August 1935 vear, and then imposed on India8. The second source of law was 
another act of Westminster: India Independence Act of 1947". This legal frame­
work lasted until 1956, when it was replaced by the first “indigenous” constitu­
tion. A key figure who influenced the political fundaments of Pakistan was its 
founder and first leader (formally as the Governor General - representative of the 
Crown) Mohammad Ah Jinnah. Unfortunately, he died in 1948, without finishing 
the process of creation of the political system. He was trained as a lawyer with the 
practice in London’s well known Lincoln’s Inn. A man belonging rather to the 
Western world, he opportunistically treated Islam as an argument for the creation 
of the state for Indian Muslims, not as a religion which he confessed himself (or at 
least follow/obey its rules). Therefore, the state he created seemed to be a secular 
republic, based on the traditions of Westminster democracy, not a dictatorship 
or a theocracy1". The postulate of a secular state has never been reached in Paki­
stan. The Objectives Resolution passed by the Pakistan’s Constitutional Assembly 
A. l’atck, J. Rvdcl, J. Węc, Najnowsza historia świata, t. 1: 1945-1963, Kraków 1997, p. 342. 
Tlie role <>f tlie Muslim Brotherhood in 1'gypt as Opposition describes prof. J. Zdanowski 
in tlie work Współczesna muzułmańska myśl społeczno-polityczna. Nurt Braci Muzułmanów, 
Warszawa 2009.
“Government of India Act 1935”, 1,egislation.yov.uk, [on-line] http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/GeoSandl l'',dw8/26/2/enaeted, 26 June 2014.
“Indian Independenee Act 1947”, I,egisfation.gov.uk, [on-line] http://www.legislation.gov. 
uk/ukpga/Gco6/10-l 1/30, 26 June 2014.
11. Khan, Constitutional and political history of Pakistan, Karachi 2007, pp. 49-55.
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12 March 1949 which is an integral part of every subsequent constitution of Paki­
stan, refers directly to the will of God and the Quran as a source of law11. The quest 
for Islamization of the state does not have a chance to become directly flashpoint 
of revolution.
11 “The Constitution of Pakistan”, Pakistani.org, [on-line] http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/ 
constitution/anncx.html, 26 June 2014.
12 S. Nawaz, Crossed Swords. Pakistan, it’s army and the wars within, Karachi 2008, pp. 142- 
143.
15 lhid.,pp. 142-143.
The first military coup’s leader in 1958, general Avub Khan did not intend to 
create military oligarchy as it has been done in Egypt. The mere fact is that the 
coup began on demand of the elected President Iskander Mirza. He limited gen. 
Avub Khan to take power as the administrator of a martial law after a long period 
of instability and inability to form a government based on the stabile parliamentary 
majority. Bloodless nature of the process show the specific of Pakistan: the army did 
not use the force to take power. It just threatens to do so. It only takes the oppor­
tunit)' caused by crisis of civil institutions and/or political organizations11 2. Another 
characteristic of the Pakistani political practice, is seeking the legitimacy for the 
military rule in general elections. Pools are usually flawed, but the opposition is 
likely imprisoned (in exception of its leaders e.g. Benazir Bhutto and her hanged 
father Zulfikar; other civil politicians had been “just” exiled). The military has 
tried generally to make their rule as temporary as possible (although word “tem­
porary” in the case of Ayub Khan meant seven years). The governments of Ayub 
tried to maintain a semblance of democracy, not only through the organization of 
the presidential election, but also the specific reform of the political system. He in­
troduced unique solution, called “basic democracy”. It has assumed participation 
of all citizens of the state regardless of gender in elections to the lowest municipal 
level. So elected local councilors (called “basic democrats”) elected another level of 
administration. In the parliamentary elections half of seats were elected by indirect 
suffrage, and half - by direct one. In this way, General Ayub Khan wanted to rebuild 
democracy “from below”, without any engagement of political parties. In fact, this 
idea was completely unrealistic. After the first such pools, Ayub announced the 
decree of restoring the functioning of political parties in Pakistan. He himself as 
newly elected president acceded to the party called the Pakistani Muslim League 
(the name referred to the political movement headed by former MA Jinnah)1’. In 
addition, under the guise of “teaching Pakistanis democracy and responsibility for 
the state”, the president has retained the right to appoint half of the members of 
parliament at their own discretion. Ayub won the presidential election on Jan. 2, 
1965. His adversary was a woman, the sister of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Fatima, 
a recognized physician and dentist, formerly close associate of her brother. She had 
been respected, so then immune to possible negative campaign or arrest. Although 
the elections were probably rigged, their importance in shaping the political con­
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sciousness of Pakistanis (or at least its elites) cannot be underestimated even today. 
Most of the Muslim jurists agreed that the woman can be the head of the Islamic 
state. This verdict opened the way for Benazir Bhutto to take up the office of prime 
minister almost 30 years later. The candidature of Miss Jinnah was also an oppor­
tunity for organized action of supporters of parliamentary democracy and civil­
ian, secular government. She has been a symbol and pattern for young Pakistani 
women and the patron of schools and medical academies for women, and many 
women’s organizations14.
“I·’,lection Campaign 1965”, Nazaria-i-Pakistan Trust, [on-line] http://nazariapak.info/Ma 
dar-i-Millat/I,lection-Campaign.php, 26 June 2014; vide: I.. Ziring, Pakistan in the twen­
tieth century. A political history, Karachi-New York 1997, pp. 281-283.
“History of civil services in India and reforms”, [on-line] www.arc.gov.in/10th/AKC_IOth 
Keport_Ch2.pdf, 26 June 2014.
These elections and the consolidation of opposition forces against the govern­
ment have shown that there is a deep political awareness among Pakistani elites 
that democracy is an effective way to govern the country. On the other hand, it 
turned out that the military is not strong enough and determined to forcefully 
eliminate political opposition and its leaders. Significant role as the custodians of 
awareness of the value of representative democracy was played by the members of 
the Pakistan Civil Service (whose traditions reached the time of the British Raj, 
when they established Indian Civil Service, employing local representatives of the 
middle class)1’.
One shall keep in mind the Pakistani elite is not homogenous. On the one hand, 
these include officers of the armed forces (the graduates of British universities of 
imperial India, or even British Sandhurst Military Academy like Avub Khan) on the 
other, representatives of bureaucracy gathered in Pakistan Civil Service. In addition 
to these “new” elites functioned as the traditional elite: great landowners of Punjab 
and Sindh, and representatives of the nascent businessmen and industrialists.
An important factor in shaping contemporary Pakistan and its political scene 
were the elections of 7 December 1970. Although they were held under condi­
tions determined by a military dictatorship, the first time they had fully demo­
cratic character. President General Yahya Khan (who took power of General Ayub 
Khan because of his illness) decided to carry them out, as the intelligence services 
wrongly predicted their effect, assuming that the largest group does not receive the 
required majority for the government. The army would act as “kingmaker” than. 
The majority of seats gained the Awami League - the party fighting for national 
autonomy for Bengalis. Than Pakistan consisted of two “wings”: Western Province 
and Eastern Province (today’s Bangladesh). Bengalis despite the fact that they were 
the largest ethnic group, felt country’s second-class citizens. The official language 
of the state - Urdu was a foreign language for them. The largest nation of the 
Western Province - Punjabis was over-represented in the most State agencies and 
central offices. However, at that time, Bengal was the most important provider of 
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national income for the state, clue to the jute crop grown there. The central gov­
ernment, however, had not shared export earnings to the poorer province. This was 
particularly acute during the catastrophic floods that hit Bengal in 1970. The com­
plete lack of interest in helping the flood victims and rebuilding the province from 
the devastation caused that Awami League, seeking autonomy, won almost all the 
seats attributable for the eastern province. However, President Yahya nominated as 
prime minister the leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, which came second in the 
election, winning elections in the Western Province. He sent the army consisting 
mostly of residents of the western part of the country’s military, to break the pro­
tests. It has become a cause of disintegration of the state, third war with India and 
the emergence of an independent state of Bangladesh1'1.
The experience of military defeat, and the breakup of the state as a result of 
ethnic conflict is still traumatizing, at least for the Pakistani elite, including the 
military. It was also proven that contrary to the official propaganda, Pakistani armed 
forces are not omnipotent and are not able to fulfill its primary task: defending 
the territorial integrity of the state. Even contemporary Pakistan is not ethnically 
homogeneous, and so the process of decomposition of the state launched in 1971 
can be expanded. The largest percentage of the population are Punjabis (44.68%), 
Pashtuns are 15.42%, 14.1% Sindhi, Siriaki 8.38% of the population, Mohjiri (de­
scendants of people who fled India in 1947) 7.57%, and 3.57% Balochi. This is ac­
companied by a mosaic of languages spoken in Pakistan. Punjabi 48%, Sindhi 12%, 
Saraiki 10%, Pashtu 8%, Urdu (official language of Pakistan as a mother tongue) 
8%, Balochi 3%, Hindko 2%, Brahui 1%, other languages 8%. Pakistan also wit­
nesses conflict between factions of Islam. Muslims constitute 96.4% of the popu­
lation. Among them 85-90% are Sunni, Shia 10-15%. Other religions constitute 
3.6%’'. For the ruling establishment in Islamabad the prospect of further division 
and separatism (supported by India or suspected of such support) is certainly very 
traumatic. On the other hand a struggle for political representation and the na­
tional aspirations of elites is an important factor constituting the political scene, 
especially in the provinces inhabited by Pashtuns: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa-and in 
Baluchistan.
Military rulers were very important for the political process in Pakistan. But 
there were also civilian governments. The most important were the years 1971- 
1977, when the head of state (first as president and later as Prime Minister) was 
charismatic leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Under 
his rule not only was the oldest continuously operating political party founded, 
but above all the Constitution has been adopted, which is still in force today. 
It introduced a parliamentarv-cabinet system of government responsible to an 
elected parliament. President’s powers were limited to perform merely ceremonial
16 J. Kieniewicz, Od liengahi do liangladenzu, Warszawa 1976, p. 249.
The World l'actbook, Central lnteligence Agency, [on-line] https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publi 
cations/tlic-world-factbook/gcos/pk.litml, 26 June 2(114. 
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functions1'’. The Constitution of 1973 is still the reference point for the politi­
cal parties calling for democratization. Pakistan People’s Party hasn’t met popu­
lar expectations. It proclaimed a socialist manifesto (similar to some extent to 
the ideology of Arab socialism) and competed in the elections under the slogan 
“bread, clothing and shelter” (Urdu: roti, kapra aur makan)19. In fact PPP be­
came (and perhaps it was from the beginning) oligarchy of Bhutto family, one 
of the richest in Sindh province. Withdrawal from its ideals became the basis 
for numerous splits caused by those activists who considered leftist program not 
only as a populist tool to gain power. The founder of the party, the Prime Minis­
ter Bhutto, posed as “Pakistani Mao” (he used the term “chairman” rather than 
“Prime Minister”). He wanted to be seen as a defender of the poor, or a modern 
social democrat2". However, the structure created by him, and the program frame­
work exists till today, playing a significant role in the political scene. Zulfikar Ah 
Bhutto has become a legendary figure. August 13, 1973, he was overthrown by 
General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, then after the bogus trial (based in false allega­
tion of ordering assassination of a political opponent) hanged on April 4, 1979, in 
a prison in Rawalpindi21. His legendary “martyrdom” had been skillfully exploited 
by his daughter Benazir Bhutto, and today by his son in law Asif Ah Zardari (until 
December 2013 President of Pakistan). It should be noted that not only the army- 
opposed to the rule of PPP, but primarily all those political forces that opposed 
the leftist policy, that ismostlv dispossessed Pakistani industrialists. They became 
the major victims of socialist policies of Bhutto. They also became supporters of 
the new military regime that replaced the leftist civilian rule. The new authorities 
seeking political base, turned to the industrial middle class, whom they promised 
(and fulfilled these promises) the return of nationalized property. They also relied 
on religious constituency. Some researchers even sought family relationships be­
tween Gen. Zia ul-Haq and one of the leaders of the fundamentalist organization 
Jamaat-e-Islami22. Even General Zia decided not to completely eliminate the 
framework of a democratic state, and adapted it to his own needs. He introduced 
a presidential system bv amendments to the Constitution of 1973. He also an­
nounced Islamic penal law “hudud” (however, the reluctance of the medical and 
legal professions meant that no such penalties as stoning or amputations were 
imposed to the legal system of the State). After the tragic death of Zia ul-Haq 
17 August 1988, the arduous process of restoration of democracy had begun. But 
continuous perceptual presence of the army in the political process has been con­
stant factor even now. Successively chiefs of staff of the army were consulted bv
Is 11. Klian, op. cit., pp. 275-287.
111 “Our history”, Pakistan Peoples Party, [on-line] http://www.ppp.org.pk/historv.html, 26 June 
2014.
2,1 I,, /.¡ring, op. cit., p. 398.
21 I. Talbot, Pakistan. A Modern History, New York 2005, p. 258.




civilian politicians. This custom took the form of so-called. “Troika” composed of 
the army chief of staff, the prime minister and the president. Personal nominations 
in the armed forces depend on the sole military circles, which civilian politicians do 
not have the courage to challenge. Also the “Afghan” and “Kashmir” foreign policy 
were practically excluded from civilian control, staying in the exclusive realm of 
“responsibility” of the armed forces2’ .
At the same time there were four changes of civil prime ministers. Most often, 
this was done on suspicion of corruption and met with full acceptance of the pub­
lic. Both of those leaders: Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party and Nawaz 
Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League (an organization representing the interests 
of industrialists and Punjabi financial elite) has been suspended that wav. Vntil 
12 October 1999 the army remained in the barracks. Then there has been the last 
military coup in which General Pervez Musharraf took the power (first as the chief 
executive than as the president). The circumstances of the event are well known 
from the general’s memoirs, “In the Line of Fire” (Warsaw Polish edition of 2007), 
and with the development of Owen B. Jones “Eye of the Storm,, (Yale, 2002). Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif has decided to dismiss Gen. Musharraf as head of the Army 
Staff, and forbade the crew of the airplane (civilian P1A flight from Colombo, Sri 
Lanka) to land in Karachi. But his comrade officers unlocked the airport, and put 
Mr. Sharif under house arrest. The prime minister, has been accused of bringing 
danger to life and health of passengers (an act that may lead to capital punishment 
Pakistan), but due to the mediation of Saudi Arabia, Nawaz Sharif found himself 
in exile. It was impossible to predict General Musharraf’s politics, the terrorist at­
tacks of September 11,2001 and accession to Pakistan “anti-terrorist coalition” had 
not taken place. Then, under pressure from the United States president has taken 
a number of democratic reforms, which he called “enlightened modernization”. 
This process was supported by the western financial assistance. President organized 
elections which had been probably rigged. Range of political parties participated: 
religious groups represented by two major parties. Also secular parties took part, 
among them specially created for the occasion, Pakistani Muslim League as “presi­
dential” one.
What’s most important for the understanding of social processes taking place 
in Pakistan, is the growth of free media in the first decade of the twenty-first cen­
tury (during military dictatorship of General Musharraf). This applies especially 
to electronic media. In addition to radio and public television stations, numerous 
are private. Particularly a fully professional TV - Geo.tv* 24. Young Pakistanis are also 
very active on the Internet. There are many websites with current affairs and infor­
mation2’. There are also active forums of fierce debate on the political situation. 
2' M.J. Gohari, l he Taliban. Ascent to Power, Karachi 200(1, pp. 18-20.
24 Geo.tv, [on-line] http://www.gco.tv/l)cfault.htnil, 26 June 2014.
2’ S.A. Sira j, “Gritical analysis of press freedom in Pakistan", Global Media journal, [on-line] 
http://www.aiou.edu.pk/ginj/artical 1(b).asp, 26 June 2014.
The Arab Spring in Pakistan? 79
Internet users exchange news as spectacular as the killing of Osama bin Laden bv 
U.S. commandos (reported live by one of the residents of Abbottabad)2'1. The gov­
ernment did not take any attempts to censor the Internet, with the exception of 
blocking access to YouTube (and this is because some content is contrary to Islam). 
An access to the popular social networking Facebook is unlimited. Internet plays 
a significant role in the political debate which takes place among young Pakistanis. 
It connects them also with the large diaspora residing outside the country. In Eng­
land alone, it has over a million people2'. Many of them maintain regular contact 
with their families in Pakistan, are interested in their problems and take part in 
political discussions that take place on the Web. They are using the high standards 
of freedom of expression, which are valid in the United Kingdom. Critical opinions 
about the Pakistani government also reach Pakistan, influencing local public opin­
ion. For example, Pakistani bloggers revealed that during the catastrophic floods 
that hit Pakistan in 2010, President Zardari and his son were on holiday at their 
family estate in Normandy They flew a helicopter that was missing in Pakistan to 
provide assistance to flood victims28.
T’lic relation of the events in Abbottabad via Twitter, 26 June 2014.
[on-line] http://www.etbnicity.ac.uk/population/sizc.html, 26 June 2014.
:s “ The skewed narrative on Pakistan flood aid: ‘help me or I’ll kill you ”, Reuters, 10 Septem­
ber 2010, [on-line] http://lilogs.rcutcrs.com/pakistan/2010/09/10/the-skcwcd-narratirc-on- 
pakistan-flood-aid-hclp-mc-or-ill-kill-vou, 26 June 2014.
“Birmingham-based charitv £35OK for Pakistan flood survivors”, Birmingham Mail, [on-line] 
http://www.binninghammail.co.uk/news/local-news/birmingham-based-charity-350k-for-pa 
kistan-flood-129546, 26 June 2014.
Ahmed Rashid, [on-line] http://wuw.ahmcdrashid.com, 26 June 2014; https://www.facebook. 
com/jalalzai.musakhan, 26 June 2014.
This information spread to the extent of Pakistani young people that eventually 
found their way into official circulation, which contributed to a drastic decline in 
support for the ruling Pakistan People’s Party and Zadrari personally. On the other 
hand, Internet users were able to mobilize philanthropic organizations in the Eng­
lish city of Birmingham (inhabited bv many Pakistanis) have transferred the money 
to the needy flood victims2'1.
There are also many NGOs in Pakistan, involved in a number of important is­
sues ranging from the common social issues to the rights of women. In this way, 
especially young Pakistanis have many forums, and ways to express their opinions 
without censorship (beyond issues against Islam, and even that is “softening” as 
a result of globalization and constant communication with the diaspora living in 
the West) or repression from the authorities. Famous journalists act as independ­
ent experts in various fields. For example, the recognized authorities in the field of 
foreign policy are Ahmed Rashid and Musa Khan Jalalzai, often quoted and invited 
by international media as a commentators and academic experts. They also have 
their own websites, which share the opinions and comments to readers both in 
Pakistan and abroad’".
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An example of the mobilization of Pakistani public opinion about social prob­
lems can be tragic event of 9 October 2012. The Taliban seriously shot a young 
resident of the Valley of Swat, Malaki Yousafzai. Daughter of a local poet Ziaud- 
din Yousafzai since 2009 ran an internet blog, describing her experience as a young 
schoolgirl, persecuted by the Taliban, who took her home valley and prevented her 
further education”. Texts written bv than 12-year-old had shown not only to the 
West, but most of all the Pakistani public opinion how serious the threat of possible 
Talibanization to their former wav of life is’2. In this way, young Pashtun girl has be­
come the most recognizable spokesperson for the rights of Pakistani women. She had 
been invited to the General Assembly of the United Nations”’. One of the leaders 
of the Pakistani Taliban, Adnan Rashid, stated in an open letter to Malala Yousafzai 
that her tragedy should never have happened. However, he didn’t apologize. When 
asked if Malala should have died or not, he replied that it is by the judgment of 
Almighty Allah that she has survived’4. Of course, one must keep in mind that the 
availability of electronic media in Pakistan is in practice limited to the middle class.
During his rule Pervez Musharraf did not restrict the freedom of assembly. 
There were numerous demonstrations of both supporters and opponents of the 
government, as well as a variety of non-governmental organizations. The most pop­
ular place of political demonstrations is Aabpara Market in the capital Islamabad’’. 
This broad area of freedoms enjoyed by Pakistanis was not available for residents of 
the military ruled Arab states’6. Therefore, one cannot use a simple analogy when 
it comes to comparing Pakistan to the Arab countries and the conclusions that the 
wave of protests of young people who removed another dictatorship in the Arab 
countries, could spread to Pakistan. Currently, the Pakistanis have in fact other 
democratic tools that enable them to achieve their political aspirations. Pakistanis 
are a very active society, making use of the possibilities offered by modern commu­
nications technology. They participate in the elections, and they are not suscepti­
ble to radical fundamentalist organizations agenda’'. This does not mean the loss
11 The Malala Yousafzai Blog & Story, [on-lincl http://uww.malala-vousafzai.com, 26 June 
2014.
’2 “Malala Yousafzai: Pakistan laliban causes revulsion by shooting girl who spoke out”, The 
Guardian, [on-line] http://www.thcguardian.coni/world/2012/oct/09/taliban-pakistan-shoot- 
girl-malala-yousafzai, 26 June 2014.
” Speech recorded in New York 26 July 2013, [on-line] http://wuw.voutubc.com/watch?v= 
N2ERrBOlyEk, 26 June 2014.
M “Taliban commander: I wish Malala Yousafzai shooting had ‘never happened’”, NBC News, 
17 June 2013, [on-line] http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_ncws/20l3/07/17/19516430-taliban 
-commandcr-i-wish-malala-yousafzai-shooting-had-ncvcr-happcned?litc, 26 June 2014.
” ‘Aabpara Market: Extremely loud and incredibly closed”, The Express Tribune, 6 Mav 2013, 
[on-line] http://tribune.com.pk/story/544923/pinl-n-rally-aabpara-inarkct-extrcniely-loud- 
and-incrcdibly-closed, 26 June 2014.
16 M. Syed, “Prospect of Arab Spring in Pakistan”, 1PR1 journal, Vol. 12, 2012, no. 2, p. 158. 
“Is Pakistan in for an Arab Spring?”, The Voice of Russia, 16 January 2013, [on-line] http:// 
english.ruvr.ru/2013_01_16/ls-Pakistan-in-for-an-Arab-Spring, 26 June 2014. 
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of fundamentalist tendencies in Pakistan. Participants of peaceful demonstrations, 
and heated discussions on the Internet forums, are members/potential recruits 
for the armed groups, called generally, though not entirely adequately “Pakistani 
Taliban”’5.
Despite these significant differences there are some events or processes in Paki­
stan that may resemble the beginnings of the ‘Arab Spring”. They were particularly 
evident in the final period of the rule of General Pervez Musharraf. In March 2007, 
the President decided to dismiss Chief Justice Muhammad Iftakar Choudharve 
on charges of abuse of power’9. In fact, the reason proved to be a critical attitude 
towards government policies. He supported the verdicts against the government in 
favor of families of missing persons (which were kept by the Pakistani intelligence 
ISI without a legal warrant). The president’s decision caused of demonstrations of 
many thousands lawyers across the country. They also had announced a general 
strike. Demonstrations were brutally pacified by the police4". However, supported 
not only by the Local, but by world public opinion, the Supreme Court considered 
the decision to dismiss Choudharv illegal and restored him to office. This deci­
sion was proof of the existence of an independent judiciary in Pakistan, and civic 
awareness among elites who were active in the defense of the independence of the 
Judiciary41.
This decision severely weakened the authority of the president. However, there 
are indications that it was part of a political game. Namely, at a time when the 
demonstrations took part, talks were held between representatives of Musharraf, 
and former PM Benazir Bhutto. The result was a project of democratization of the 
country, assuming the president will remain in office in exchange for the holding of 
free elections in which the favorite was Mrs. Bhutto. October 6, 2007 presidential 
elections were held (under the Constitution of 1973 the Electoral College consist­
ing of members of parliament and provincial parliamentary assemblies elected the 
head of State), which Pervez Musharraf. There was legal controversy, which became 
the basis of a complaint pending before the Supreme Court. Given an argument - 
first of all, that the Assembly of the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa) should be dissolved. The inhabitants of that Pashtun province have
s 1). Montero, “W hy the Taliban appeal to Pakistani youth’ The tribal system that once 
grounded young people no longer provides enough opportunities”, 16 June 2006, The Chris­
tian Science Monitor, [on-line] http://www.csinonitor.coni/2006/0616/p07s02-wose.htinl, 
26 June 2014.
51 "Musharraf sacks Pak chief justice”, 9 March 2007, llediff India Abroad, [on-line] http:// 
www.rcdiff.com/ncws/2007/inar/09pakcj.htin, 26 June 2014.
“Crisis for Musharraf oxer justice chief’s sacking”, 1'he Telegraph, 17 March 2007, [on-line] 
http://www.tclcgraph.co.Uk/news/worldncws/l 545843/Crisis-for-Musharraf-ovcr-justice-chicfs 
-sacking.litnil, 26 June 2014.
11 “Iftikhar Chaudhry reinstated as Pakistan Supreme Court Chief Justice”, AndhraNeu s.net, 
[on-line] http://uvvw.andlirancws.net/]ntl/2007/Julv/20/lftikhar-Chaudhrv-rcinstated-8763. 
asp, 26 June 2014.
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not been taken into account, which disrupted the democratic nature of the elec­
tions. Second term of office of the parliament and assemblies ended in 2008, so 
they had a weak mandate to choose the head of state for another 5 year term·12.
President Musharraf, fearing unfavorable verdict of the Supreme Court decided 
on a desperate step and 3 July 2007, announced a state of emergency in an attempt 
to impose a new provisional constitutional order. However, the Supreme Court did 
not accept his actions. This decision had public support. People demanded democ­
ratization of the state and free elections. Also, the United States reacted verv nerv­
ously, seeking the annulment of the decision to impose direct military rule. This 
meant the reversal of Washington’s former ally·1’. There was therefore a paradox: 
Musharraf became unacceptable by both the anti-American majority of society and 
by the U.S. administration. This meant that his days were numbered. The situa­
tion was even worse for the president. On December 27, 2007 his main opponent, 
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has been assassinated. Police protection of 
her election rally in Rawalpindi turned out to be insufficient. The former prime 
minister died in hospital due to injuries caused by a suicide bomber44. Government 
investigation, supported by British experts from Scotland Yard, the blamed Paki­
stani Taliban and their leader Baitullah Mehsud, who’s goal had been to destabilize 
the country and discredit its government4’.
■|2 [on-line] http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/09/staying-pakistans-prcsidcntial-elcction .
php, 26 June 2014.
4'’ “Musharraf Declares State of Emergency", The New York limes, 3 November 2007, [on- 
-line] http://www.nytimes.eom/2007/l l/03/world/asia/04pakistan.html?_r=0, 26 June 2014. 
“Benazir Bhutto assassinated”, CNN, 27 December, [on-line] http://edition.cnn.com/2007/ 
\VORI,D/asiapcf/12/27/pakistan.sharif, 26 June 2014.
4’ “Q&A: Benazir Bhutto assassination”, BBC News, 3 May 2013, [on-line] http://www.bbc.
co.uk/ncws/world-asia-22394552, 26 June 2014.
46 “Musharraf granted bail in Benazir Bhutto assassination case”, '¡'he Hindu, 20 May 2013, 
[on-line] li ttp://www. thchindu.com/news/iiiternational/south-asia/musharraf-granted-bail- 
in-benazir-bhutto-assassination-case/articlc4732893.ccc, 26 June 2014.
4' [on-line] http://www.app.com.pk/elcction, 26 June 2014.
“Pakistan’s Musharraf steps down”, BBC News, 18 August 2008, [on-line] http://ncus.bbc. 
co.uk/2/lii/7567451 .stm, 26 June 2014.
The suspicion of connections of President Musharraf with the assassin has 
not been sufficiently proven and May 20, 2013, the court acquitted him of those 
charges46. Death of a popular politician united Pakistani public opinion around her 
widower Asif Ali Zardari and their son Bilawal. Their Pakistan People’s Party won 
the elections in 2008, and its new leader was elected president of Pakistan47. This 
was possible because both the winning PPP and the largest opposition Pakistani 
Muslim League Nawaz Sharif were ready to carry out the procedure for impeach­
ment, which Musharraf wanted to avoid4s. One could say that it is largely Pakistani 
public opinion who led to the democratization by the demanding of free elections. 
But here the similarity with the ‘Arab Spring” ends. Contrary to events in Egypt, 
the army from the beginning showed no interest in defending their commander 
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and their own position in the state and the separation of the functions of the Presi­
dent (which was Musharraf) and the Chief of Staff of the Army (which took Gen. 
Ashfaq Parvez Kayani). So they remained passive in the barracks, allowing democ­
ratization process to go on41’.
Is there any analogy between Pakistan and the Arab states when it comes to the 
process of democratic transformation? Is the concept of the ‘Arab Spring” present 
in the Pakistani public opinion? These questions can be answered positive. In the 
May 2013 parliamentary elections had been held and came in very calm conditions. 
Of course there is strong tendency of local authorities to support some candidates, 
and to block others during registration process, as pointed to the European Union 
observers’". However, comparing these with previous elections, held in the shadow 
of a possible intervention of the army, we can talk about significant progress. It was 
particularly evident during the election campaign, which involved many, especially 
voung people. The third force in the parliament was the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf of 
Imran Khan (former captain of the national cricket team, who led Pakistan in 1992 to 
the title of world champions, beating England). PT1 obtained the second result after 
winning Pakistan Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif. However, because of the electoral 
system, PTI is third-largest fraction in the National Assembly’* 1. Imran Khan’s Party 
won the provincial elections in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’2. In his election campaign Im­
ran Khan directly referred to the ‘Arab Spring”, criticizing the existing political system 
as corrupt, riddled with nepotism and blocking prospects for young people. Also he 
paid attention to the widening social gap between the “ruling elite” and the masses.
0 “Kayani supports democracy”, The Nation, 3 May 2013, [on-line] http://www.nation.com. 
pk/pakistan-news-ncwspaper-daily-cnglish-onlinc7coluinns/()3-May-2()13/kayani-supports- 
democracy, 26 June 2014.
11 [on-line] http://wi\vv.dailvtimcs.com.pk/dcfault.asp?pagc = 2013'%3CO7%5C1 l'%5Cstory_l 1 
-7-2013_pgl_2, 26 June 2014.
1 Pakistan General ['.lections 2013: [on-line] http://liamariwcb.com/pakistan-clcction-2013, 
26 June 2014.
: “Tchrik-i-lnsaf sweeps Khyber Pakhtunkhwa”, The Nation, 12 May 2013, [on-line] http:// 
www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-ncws-ncwspapcr-daily-cnglish-online/clcctions-20l 3/12-Mav- 
2013/tchrik-i-insaf-swccps-khyber-pakhtunkhwa, 26 June 2014.
” “Pakistan faces Arab spring, declares Imran Khan”, The Scotsman, 28 July 2011, [on- 
-line] http://www.scotsman.com/news/pakistan-faces-arab-spring-declarcs-imran-khan-l-17 
77033, 26 June 2014.
“Pakistan elections: cx-crickctcr Imran Khan offers ‘third wav’”, I he Guardian, 3 May 2013, 
[on-line] http://www.theguardian.com/world/vidco/2013/may/()4/pakistan-clections-imran- 
khan-third-way-vidco, 26 June 2014.
Those terms are not “pure populism” in the case of a country whose citizens 
do not pav income tax, or whose amounts are about 60 USD per year’’ . Tehreek-e- 
Insaf means “Movement for Justice”. The program of the party in many ways tries 
to follow the European social democracy and the concept of “third way”. Their 
slogans are addressed to young Pakistanis from the lower-middle class, experienc­
ing the most painful consequences of the economic crisis’4. Anti-American agenda 
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(criticism of the government, which in fact allows making drone attacks on tar­
gets in Pakistan, and the operations of U.S. Special Forces, even in the immediate 
vicinity of the state capital) are in turn focused on moderate supporters of the 
Taliban. That strategy turned out to be a success in case of the province of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa11.
“ “Imran Khan: A prayer for Pakistan”, Support Imran Khan, [on-line] http://www.supporti- 
mrankhan.org/Articles/storv.aspx?&id = 139, 26 June 2014.
* 26 June 2014.
’ “Can a millionaire ex-erieket star go from plavboy to prime minister? Yes he Khan!”, Mail 
Online, 12 November 2012, [on-line] http://www.dailymail.eo.uk/ncws/article-2230965/ 
linran-Klian-Can-millionaire-ex-crickct-star-playboy-primc-ininister-Ycs-Klian.html, 26 Ju­
ne 2014.
,s ‘“Imran Khan, Jewish agent’: welcome to the wonderful world of Pakistani politics”, The 
Conversation, 7 May 2013, [on-line] http://theconvcrsation.com/imran-khan-jewisb-agcnt- 
wclcomc-to-thc-wondcrful-world-of-pakistani-politics-13975, 26 June 2014.
It is hard to idealize Imran Khan and his party: There are serious allegations 
that behind antiestablishment slogans such as “Pakistani tsunami that will sweep 
away the ruling system” there is the Pakistani 1SI military intelligence (sometimes 
called a “hidden government”). Khan has thus been a kind of safety valve, which 
will engage the Pakistani youth discontented by difficult economic situation. So it 
would prevent the “real”, uncontrolled “Spring in Pakistan”. Khan reproaches good 
contacts with Gen. Hamid Gul (known from supporting the Taliban), and the sup­
port which PT1 granted Pervez Musharraf during the referendum legitimizing his 
coup16. This undermines the credibility of the Khan, along with his un-orthodox 
private life: not only marrying the daughter of British-Jewish millionaire Jemima 
Goldsmith, but also rather “easy” way of life, far from Islamic ideals is what is cur­
rently being challenged. On the other hand, that celebrity ex-cricket star, divorced 
from millionaire with a reputation of playboy criticizes “thick English women in 
mini-skirts”. Khan is an excellent representative of Pakistani middle class. They 
often have such “double life” too17. In contrast, pointing out that he leaves far from 
conditions of the poor commoners - his potential voters, it should be remembered 
that exactly the same were political beginnings of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a socialist 
from a wealthy family of landlords of Sindh province. It is therefore difficult to 
assess to what extent the agenda of Imran Khan is his real program, and to what ex­
tent it is only a part of the political ritual. The fact that the candidate was perceived 
as a significant threat to the largest parties, providing use quite sharp, populist 
arguments in a negative campaign. Reproached Khan Ties with “a Jewish family in 
the UK”, which was to prove the existence of a “conspiracy of Jewish-Indian servant 
ready to weaken or even to destroy Pakistani people”18.
PTI activists were trying to reach the voters with the message of the party pro­
gram using not only traditional but also modern means of communication such as 
Twitter and Facebook. On the social network are profiles of a few dozen supporters, 
The Arab Spring in Pakistan? 85
and local branches of PTI. There are also Imran Khan’s numerous fan pages. Some 
of them are run by Pakistanis residing abroad from the U.S. and Australia to the 
Great Britain. Similarly, were supporters of the thesis of the rigging of the elections 
in 2013 were active on the portal. They have tried to convince the audience that 
elections had been rigged and Imran Khan shall be the new Prime Minister’".
From July 20 B ruling Pakistani Muslim League Nawaz Sharif has a stable ma­
jority in parliament, allowing the exercise of power without a coalition partner. 
This was confirmed bv the presidential election that took place on 29 June 20B. 
Chosen as the candidate of PML Mamnoon Hussain, former governor of the prov­
ince of Sindh has been elected easily60. His opponent was Wajihuddin Ahmad 
from PTI. It is difficult to predict future developments. Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif undoubtedly is the representative of the political elite that has ruled Paki­
stan intermittently since 1947. Any serious change cannot therefore be expected 
in policy whether internal or foreign. So it is no indication that he tried to carry 
out some measures to improve the standard of living, especially of young Paki­
stanis. For example, economic difficulties such as shortage of electricity supply to 
households due to insufficient power plants. The Prime Minister wants to focus 
public attention on the complex relations with India. Pakistanis are historically 
sensitive about the relations with their bigger neighbour. On the other hand, some 
analysts notice a positive change in the look that Sharif is taking towards India. It 
is now closer dialogue or even easing tension. We shall remember that Mr. Sharif 
had best relations with BJP government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, so his understand­
ing with Modi is much similar. Also Imran Khan wows for the comprehensive 
dialogue with New Delhi61.
’ ‘‘Tehrik-i-lnsaf sweeps Khyber 1’aklitunkhwa”, The Nation, 12 May 2013, [on-line] http:// 
www.nation.coin.pk/pakistan-news-newspapcr-clailv-cnglish-onliiie/elections-20l 3/12-Mav- 
2013/tchrik-i-insaf-sweeps-kliybcr-pakhtunkhwa, 26 June 2014.
" "Mamnoon I lussain elected as new Pakistani president”, BBC Neus, 30 July 2013, [on-line] 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iiews/world-asia-23493649, 26 June 2014.
1 “Indian views of Nawaz Sharif’s election ”, Shashank /oshi, 15 May 2013, [on-line] http:// 
shashankjoshi.wordpress.coni/2013/05/1 5/indian-vicws-of-nawaz-sharifs-elcction, 26 June 
2014.
: 'Watch out for the Bries... and for the Next I I ”, The Guardian, 18 February 2011, [on-line]
http://www.theguardian.coni/global-dcvelopment/poverty-niattcrs/2011/feb/l 8/brics-ncxt-l 1 
-economv-transformation-uk,31 June 2013.
Talking about prospects for social or economic revolution, much depends on 
the further economic development of Pakistan as well as the equitable distribution 
of its positive effects. Pakistan has been called by the IMF experts as one of the 
11 fastest growing economies in the world (so-called Next-11), ahead of members 
of the BRICS group (including traditional enemy - India)62. The problem of un­
equal distribution of “fruits” of economic growth is noticeable not only by Imran 
Khan and his party, but also by foreign observers. The UK Department for Interna­
tional Development depends on further assistance for Pakistan to perform a major 
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tax reform. It would bit poor citizens in the first place'”. A serious problem that 
can be a source of social unrest and a brake to economic development is the lack of 
electricity. Current infrastructure comes mainly from the 60s and 70s, and is based 
on imported raw materials such as gas and oil. Domestic stock of it is insufficient. 
Existing possibilities, as hydro power, are running out, as population growth in­
creases the demand for water for human consumption. Nuclear energy looks as the 
best solution but the construction of new power plants takes time, which Pakistan 
does not have. The search for their own gas deposits is in progress, inter aha, with 
the participation of Polish experts, but even if it is successful, it will not fully satisfy 
the demands. Australian experts suggest, however, that Pakistan could use more 
natural potential which is solar energy by building solar collectors in the desertM. 
Until this problem is solved it is bound to get worse, and it will increase social dis­
content arising from the progress of civilization, which takes place in contemporary 
Pakistan. The reason for the protests could be prolonged power outages, causing 
that life in the summer with high temperatures and humidity will return again to 
the level of half a century ago. Young people from affluent families today are not 
accustomed to living without air conditioning and access to the Internet or even 
a television. The economic crisis in West caused that emigration is no longer the 
simplest alternative for ambitious people seeking a better life, although the rate of 
migration is still negative and last year reached a value of -2 (i.e. 2 immigrants per 
1 thousand inhabitants)’”.
Summarizing the above considerations, one should notice that despite signifi­
cant similarities to the Arab countries and close contacts resulting from the civili­
zational affinities, there are significant differences that cause that Pakistan has not 
experienced a phenomenon similar to the “Arab Spring” and there is little evidence 
that such a massive social rebellion of representatives of the young generation ex­
isted in Pakistan. This stems primarily from the fact that the political system of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan is now a democracy and has all the instruments for 
channeling social discontent, such as free media, and above all elective parliament 
and local assemblies, and the indirect presidential elections (a solution found in 
mature democracies as often as the general elections). Even temporarily exercis­
ing power, military in the country is not ready for such a fierce confrontation with 
society as it is today in Syria. It does not look ready to crack down free media and 
political opposition, as it happened in Tunisia and Egypt. The party system of Pa-
“UK aid to Pakistan should continue but future increases must rest on domestic tax re­
form”, The Telegraph, 4 April 2013, [on-line] http://www.telcgraph.co.uk/news/worldncws/ 
asia/pakistan/9969525/lIK-aid-to-Pakistan-should-continue-but-futurc-incrcascs-must-rest- 
on-domcstic-tax-reform.html, 31 June 2014.
M “Pakistan has a bright energy future", I he International News, 31 May 2013, [on-line] http:// 
www.thcncws.coin.pk/Ibdavs-Ncws-9-181003-Pakistan-has-a-bright-cncrgx-futurc, 31 June 
2014.
Index .Mundi, |on-linc] http://www.indexmundi.eom/g/g.aspx?v=27&c=pk&l = cn, 31 June 
2014.
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kistan is so pluralistic that reflects different trends of religious fundamentalism, 
moderate conservatism of the socialism. Fundamentalist forces, however, have not 
enough social support to be able to take power in the country alone or in coalition, 
as it happened in Egypt in the event associated with the Muslim Brotherhood Party 
of AKP in Turkey. The two religious parties: the Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema- 
e-Islam have in fact a total of 12 seats out of 265 seats in National Assembly (lower 
house)“.
Armed group called “Pakistani Taliban”, although being a serious threat to state 
security forces does not have enough popular support to seize power in Pakistan by 
force. The army remains the guarantee of moderate secularism. In contrast, charac­
teristics of the “Arab Spring” social demands, especially related to the expectations 
of the younger generation, have become just part of the political game, which took 
place during the last election campaign. Whether the political system will absorb 
the revolutionary ferment depends on several factors, including the responsibility 
of the political elite, especially the opposition leader Imran Khan. Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif does not seem to be interested in the use of undemocratic methods. 
But it doesn’t mean he is not ready to defend his post using police force against 
demonstrates gathered by Imran Khan. Prime Minister’s activity is focused on the 
fight against the former president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who removed him from 
power in 1999 in a coup d’etat. Of course, an important factor here is personal 
revenge, but it can have a positive effect: a chance to judge a politician who has 
abused the law to gain power in the state. But it also generates serious threat: it is 
hard to predict if the Army allows prosecuting its previous chief, or not.
It is difficult to clearly assess how optimism towards the democratic process, 
which some of the media and Polish analysts exhibit, is justified. Previous parlia­
mentary elections of 2008 were held in an atmosphere of plebiscite. Voting for the 
Pakistani People’s Party was in fact expressing disobedience to the than military 
government and wowing for transfer of power into civil hands. So the election of 
2013 can be called a real election based on the dispute on the shape of the state. 
Until the next election one cannot not know for sure whether parliament will sur­
vive a full term without the intervention of the army or the High Court (one has 
to remember that the first term of Nawaz Sharif ended early, because of corruption 
charges, during the second it was overthrown bv the army). It will also be a test of 
strength for the opposition: if it is ready to participate in the next elections, or will 
its followers tried to move out into the street effectively. The economic situation 
home and abroad would surely have some influence on the stabilization of the in­
ternal situation in Pakistan. The crisis clearly deteriorating social mood and makes 
young people particularly vulnerable to radicalization. The realization of positive 
forecasts for economic growth and the existence of a group of Next -11 with Paki­
stan in the composition, will surely be a stabilizing factor and a favorable political
Pakistan (.encrai I1’,lection: [on-line] http://liaiiiariweb.coin/pakistan-elcction-2013, 31 June 
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scene rather than moderate parties. Unfortunately last events in Islamabad look 
like “somebody” lost his nerves. Imran Khan organized large demonstration of his 
supporters urging Nawaz Sharif to step down and to organize new elections. For 
the first time in Pakistani history, a mainstream politician used the world “Revolu­
tion” (Urdu: Inqilah) to explain his action against the government. He also called 
for the civil disobedience (e.g. bv refusing to pay VAT). Until 31 of August the 
Prime Minister refused to listen to such suggestions and has ordered the police to 
crack down those rallies6'. The popular opinion is turning in favor another military 
takeover. The Chief of Army Staff called the meeting of corps commanders (the 
highest brass of Pakistani armed forces) because of the unstable situation in the 
country6S. At the moment it is impossible to predict if gen. Raheel Sharif decide to 
take power himself, or whether he will just force the Prime Minister to step down 
and to organize new elections. Is once again the army perceived by the majority of 
the public opinion as the protector of the State against the civilian, too-ambitious 
and to-selfish politicians?
6' “Inqilab - when blood comes cheap”, Dawn, 31 August 2014, [on-line] http://www.dawn. 
com/ncws/1128999/inqilab-when-blood-comcs-chcap, 31 June 2014.
(>s “Political crisis must end through political means, Army savs", Dawn, 31 August 2014, [on-line] 
http://uvvw.dawn.eom/news/l 129001/arniy-chief-calls-corps-comniandcrs-inccting, 31 June 
2014.
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